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DO YOU KNOW THE FAIR MARKET VALUE OF YOUR PROPERTY?: A 
CALL TO THE LEGISLATURE TO REVISE SECTION 775.089, FLORIDA 
STATUTES, GOVERNING RESTITUTION 
Adam M. Hapner*  
INTRODUCTION  
Restitution is a criminal sentencing procedure by which the victim of a crime 
may seek compensation for damages, such as bodily injury or property damage, 
that are caused by the defendant’s crime.1 Restitution proceedings and the awards 
they produce are very important from a public policy standpoint because they not 
only provide an alternative, more cost-effective avenue of relief for the victim,2 but 
they also impress realistic consequences upon the defendant for his actions.3 
Unfortunately, when the State is unable to prove the amount of loss sustained by 
the victim due to impractical valuation measures and stringent requirements of 
proof, it causes unjust results that conflict with the purposes of restitution.4  
First, this article generally summarizes Florida law governing restitution 
proceedings. Next, it explains the primary measurements of valuing property—fair 
market value and “fair amount” value—that are used when determining the amount 
of loss sustained by the victim.5 Following a discussion of the potential methods of 
proving the amount of loss sustained by the victim and the evidentiary problems 
 ________________________  
 * Thank you to the members of the Barry Law Review who helped with the editing process. Thank you to 
my friends, both judges and law clerks, at the Fifth District Court of Appeal who took the time to read a prior 
version of this article. Lastly, thank you to my fiancée and my mom for your love and support. 
 1. See generally FLA. STAT. § 775.089 (2014) (providing Florida courts with authority to order restitution 
to a victim who suffers damages as a result of a defendant’s criminal offense or episode). 
 2. State v. Hitchmon, 678 So. 2d 460, 462 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1996) (“The restitution statute was adopted 
for the benefit of crime victims. It is intended to provide an additional alternative to reimburse a crime victim, over 
and above traditional remedies like a civil lawsuit.” (citing Spivey v. State, 531 So. 2d 965, 967 (Fla. 1988))). 
 3. See Paroline v. United States, 134 S. Ct. 1710, 1726 (2014) (“The primary goal of restitution is 
remedial or compensatory, but it also serves punitive purposes.” (citations omitted)); Kelly v. Robinson, 479 U.S. 
36, 49 n.10 (1986) (“Restitution is an effective rehabilitative penalty because it forces the defendant to confront, in 
concrete terms, the harm his actions have caused.”); Glaubius v. State, 688 So. 2d 913, 916 (Fla. 1997) (stating 
that the “purpose of restitution is to adequately compensate a victim and to serve the rehabilitative, deterrent, and 
retributive goals of the criminal justice system”). 
 4. See, e.g., Paroline, 134 S. Ct. at 1727 (stating that “[i]t would be inconsistent” with the purposes of 
restitution to apply restitution statutes “in a way that leaves offenders with the mistaken impression that [their 
crime] is . . . victimless”); Phillips v. State, 141 So. 3d 702, 705 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2014) (per curiam) (“The fact 
that it was practically impossible for the victim to establish the restitution amount without relying on hearsay 
evidence appears to have caused an unjust result for the victim, because she and the state appear to have no other 
means by which to prove the restitution amount.”). 
 5. This article focuses on measuring the amount of the victim’s property damages, as opposed to bodily 
injury damages. When an offense has resulted in bodily injury to a victim, section 775.089(2)(a), Florida Statutes, 
specifically provides the damages recoverable by the victim, such as the cost of necessary medical and related 
professional services, lost income, and, if necessary, funeral and related expenses. FLA. STAT. § 775.089(2)(a) 
(2014). 
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associated with each method, this article then explores the advantages and 
disadvantages of a recent statutory proposal by The Fourth District Court of Appeal 
of Florida, which recommends relaxing the standard measurement of value and 
permitting hearsay evidence in restitution proceedings.6 Finally, this article 
compares the Fourth District Court’s recommendation to the federal approach and 
concludes that the Florida Legislature should adopt a variant of the Fourth District 
Court’s recommendation that provides due process to the defendant and protects 
the integrity of the judicial system. 
I.  FLORIDA LAW GOVERNING RESTITUTION PROCEEDINGS 
After a criminal defendant has been convicted of a crime, section 775.089, 
Florida Statutes, Restitution, authorizes Florida courts to award restitution to any 
victim7 of the crime “[i]n addition to any punishment” to the defendant.8 The 
primary purpose of section 775.089 is to “uphold the rights of crime victims by 
guaranteeing that they are compensated for their losses.”9 Section 775.089 is also 
intended to serve the rehabilitative, deterrent, and retributive goals of the criminal 
justice system.10 
Nevertheless, restitution is appropriate only if the defendant’s crime causes 
loss or damage to the victim and the loss or damage is significantly related to the 
crime.11 When appropriate, the court is required to order the defendant to make 
restitution to the victim “unless it finds clear and compelling reasons not to order 
such restitution.”12 Under section 775.089, “in determining whether to order 
 ________________________  
 6. See infra text accompanying note 82. 
 7. Pursuant to section 775.089, Florida Statutes: 
The term “victim” as used in this section and in any provision of law relating to restitution 
means each person who suffers property damage or loss, monetary expense, or physical 
injury or death as a direct or indirect result of the defendant’s offense or criminal episode, 
and also includes the victim’s estate if the victim is deceased, the victim’s next of kin if the 
victim is deceased as a result of the offense, and the victim’s trade association if the offense 
[meets additional requirements].  
FLA. STAT. § 775.089(1)(c) (2014). 
 8. See id. § 775.089(1)(a); Smith v. Bartlett, 570 So. 2d 360, 361 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1990) (holding that 
“one who pleads guilty or is found guilty by a jury has been ‘convicted’ under the provisions of section 775.089(8) 
even in the absence of an adjudication”). Restitution may be either monetary or nonmonetary. FLA. STAT. § 
775.089(1)(a) (2014). 
 9. Koile v. State, 934 So. 2d 1226, 1233 (Fla. 2006). 
 10. See, e.g., Glaubius v. State, 688 So. 2d 913, 915 (Fla. 1997). 
 11. See id. (stating that “to order restitution under the statute, the court must find that the loss or damage is 
causally connected to the offense and bears a significant relationship to the offense”); see, e.g., Schuette v. State, 
822 So. 2d 1275, 1284 (Fla. 2002) (“In conclusion, we hold that the mere occurrence of an accident while the 
defendant is engaged in the criminal offense of driving with a suspended license does not as a matter of law 
mandate the award of restitution for the damages arising out of the accident.”); Johnston v. State, 870 So. 2d 877, 
879 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2004) (“We conclude that restitution for the items stolen during the burglary is proper, 
because the loss bears a significant relationship to the dealing in stolen property.”); Jackson v. State, 711 So. 2d 
602, 603 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1998) (“In this case, the state met its burden in showing, by a preponderance of the 
evidence, a significant relationship between the loss and Jackson’s actions. Put simply, had Jackson not set fire to 
Mr. Gollett’s house, it would not have burned down.”). 
 12. FLA. STAT. § 775.089(1)(a) (2014). If the court orders restitution in an amount less than the full amount 
of the victim’s loss, it must state its reasons on the record. Id. § 775.089(1)(b)1. If the defendant is placed on 
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restitution and the amount of such restitution, [the court] shall consider the amount 
of the loss sustained by any victim as a result of the offense.”13 
If the defendant does not agree to the amount of the victim’s loss in a plea 
agreement or otherwise,14 the court must hold an evidentiary hearing to determine 
the amount.15 The State has the burden of demonstrating the amount of the victim’s 
loss, and the court must resolve any dispute as to the proper amount or type of 
restitution by the preponderance of the evidence.16 The trial court cannot arbitrarily 
award any amount of restitution that it believes may adequately compensate the 
victim.17 Rather, “the amount of restitution must be supported by competent, 
substantial evidence.”18 
The aforementioned rules raise two issues that must be addressed in every 
restitution proceeding in Florida. First, what is the appropriate measure of the 
victim’s loss? Second, how should that amount be proved? 
II.  MEASUREMENTS OF PROPERTY LOSS 
A.   Fair Market Value 
In most cases, the appropriate measure of the victim’s property loss is the fair 
market value of the property at the time of the offense.19 “Fair market value” is 
defined as “[t]he price that a seller is willing to accept and a buyer is willing to pay 
on the open market and in an arm’s-length transaction.”20 To establish fair market 
value, the State must present either direct testimony or evidence of all of the 
following four factors: “(1) original market cost; (2) manner in which the item was 
used; (3) the general condition and quality of the item; and (4) the percentage of 
depreciation.”21  
  
probation, “[t]he court shall make the payment of restitution a condition of probation in accordance with s. 
948.03.” Id. § 775.089(1)(a). 
 13. Id. § 775.089(6)(a). 
 14. “Where restitution is part of a plea bargain, it should be liberally construed in favor of making the 
victim whole.” Hercule v. State, 655 So. 2d 1256, 1257 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1995). 
 15. See FLA. STAT. § 775.089(7) (2014); see also Molter v. State, 892 So. 2d 1115, 1117 (Fla. Dist. Ct. 
App. 2004) (stating that once the defendant objects to the amount of restitution, “the trial court [is] required to hear 
evidence on the matter”); Strickland v. State, 746 So. 2d 1189, 1190 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1999) (“[S]ection 
775.089(7) contemplates an evidentiary hearing when there is a dispute as to restitution.”). 
 16. FLA. STAT. § 775.089(7) (2014). 
 17. See, e.g., Glaubius v. State, 688 So. 2d 913, 915 (Fla. 1997). 
 18. Thompson v. State, 68 So. 3d 425, 426 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2011); see also Del Valle v. State, 80 So. 3d 
999, 1020 (Fla. 2011) (Lewis, J., dissenting) (“On appeal, if the defendant establishes that the amount of restitution 
is not supported by competent, substantial evidence, that restitution order may be reversed.”).  
 19. See State v. Hawthorne, 573 So. 2d 330, 333 (Fla. 1991) (“We recognize that in most instances the 
victim’s loss and the fair market value of the property at the time of the offense will be the same.”). 
 20. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1785 (10th ed. 2014). 
 21. Hawthorne, 573 So. 2d at 332; see also Mansingh v. State, 588 So. 2d 636, 638 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 
1991). The four fair market value factors were first announced in Negron v. State, 306 So. 2d 104 (Fla. 1974), in 
which the Supreme Court of Florida held that when the value of property is an essential element of a crime, the 
value must be established based on the fair market value of the property at the time of the offense. Id. at 108. 
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1. Replacement Value 
Normally, replacement value is an improper measure of the victim’s loss.22 But 
if a “ready market of identical items” to the property exists,23 or if replacement 
value is the actual loss suffered by the victim,24 replacement value and fair market 
value may be the same.  
2. Retail Value 
In general, retail value is also an improper measure of the victim’s loss.25 
However, if the victim deals in the type of goods lost, stolen, or damaged, retail 
value—rather than replacement or wholesale value—may represent the true market 
value of the victim’s loss.26  
B.   “Fair Amount” Value 
Fair market value is not the sole standard for determining restitution amounts.27 
In State v. Hawthorne, the Supreme Court of Florida held that when fair market 
value does not adequately reflect the victim’s loss, such as with a family heirloom, 
or when consideration of depreciation would be inequitable, such as with a recently 
purchased car, the court “may exercise such discretion as required to further the 
purposes of restitution.”28 In a subsequent case, the Supreme Court of Florida 
interpreted the holding in Hawthorne to mean that “the trial court has discretion to 
take into account any appropriate factor in arriving at a fair amount [that] will 
adequately compensate a victim for his or her loss and further the purposes of 
restitution.”29 In other words, if the trial court finds that fair market value is an 
 ________________________  
 22. See Ibrahim v. State, 866 So. 2d 749, 750 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2004) (“Generally, fair market value, not 
replacement value, is the correct measure of damages.”). 
 23. See Domaceti v. State, 616 So. 2d 1148, 1149 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1993) (“Certainly where there is a 
ready market of identical items to the stolen item, restitution should be limited to its replacement.”). 
 24. See Dixon v. State, 601 So. 2d 606, 607 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1992) (“In the instant case, the victim for 
purposes of restitution is the insurer . . . . Because the insurance policy involved in this matter provides coverage 
based upon replacement cost, we cannot say that the trial court abused its discretion in concluding that the loss 
caused by the appellant’s act was the replacement cost of the stolen items.” (citation omitted)). 
 25. See, e.g., Walentukonis v. State, 932 So. 2d 1136, 1137 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2006) (holding that the trial 
court erred in taking judicial notice of the retail value of a damaged truck based on a used car guide to determine 
the amount of restitution); Fletcher v. State, 800 So. 2d 309, 311 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2001) (“In arriving at fair 
market value, the trial court must first consider the ‘original market cost’ of the stolen item, which was $1500 
here. Accordingly, the $4500-$6000 retail cost of the watch [at the time it was purchased] was irrelevant.”). 
 26. See, e.g., Nix v. State, 604 So. 2d 920, 922 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1992) (holding that “the retail value of 
the gasoline is an appropriate measure of the fair market value” of fuel stolen from a gas station); Garrison v. 
State, 553 So. 2d 1377, 1379 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1989) (“Under the evidence presented to the trial court, that court 
could reasonably conclude that Mr. Garrison effectively stole thirteen retail sales from the victim, and that the 
victim was entitled to be reimbursed for those thirteen retail sales at the fair market value established by the retail 
price.”). 
 27. See State v. Hawthorne, 573 So. 2d 330, 333 (Fla. 1991). 
 28. Id. at 333 & nn.4–5. 
 29. Glaubius v. State, 688 So. 2d 913, 915 (Fla. 1997) (emphasis added). 
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inappropriate measure of the victim’s loss, the appropriate measure is “fair 
amount” value.30 
Not surprisingly, there is no precise definition of “fair amount” value. In 
recognition that the primary purpose of restitution is to compensate the victim, the 
measure is intentionally broad so it can encompass instances when the market 
value of the victim’s property does not adequately compensate the victim.31 For 
example, in Hawthorne, after the defendant was found guilty of grand theft auto, 
the trial court ordered him to pay restitution to the owner of the stolen vehicle “in 
the amount of $1500 for the vehicle and $250 for the owner’s travel expenses.”32 
This amount of restitution was based solely on the victim’s testimony: 
At the restitution hearing, the owner testified that the auto at issue 
was a 1979 Ford Fairmount; had a book value of $1650 in 1985 
when it was purchased for $1530; was repaired shortly before the 
theft and was in good operating condition; was stolen 14 months 
after purchase; and was valued at zero after the theft because it had 
been completely burned. The owner further testified that she did 
not know the mileage of the car at the time it was stolen, and that 
she had incurred expenses of $250 in securing alternative 
transportation.33 
On appeal, the First District Court of Appeal of Florida reversed the trial court’s 
award of restitution, holding that the State had failed to establish the fair market 
value of the stolen vehicle at the time of the theft because the State presented no 
evidence regarding the percentage of depreciation for the vehicle.34  
The Supreme Court of Florida reversed the First District Court, holding that the 
amount of restitution ordered by the trial court was supported by competent, 
substantial evidence.35 Specifically, the court stated that because the victim 
testified to the “purchase price of the car, the book value at the time of purchase, 
the repairs made to the car, and the general condition of the car[,] . . . the amount of 
the restitution order was supported by the evidence.”36 Thus, in Hawthorne, 
although there was no precise measurement of the victim’s loss, and the victim did 
not testify to all of the fair market value factors, based on the evidence presented, 
the court found that $1500 was a “fair amount” to compensate the victim for the 
car and to further the purposes of restitution.37 
 ________________________  
 30. See id. 
 31. See Hawthorne, 573 So. 2d at 333 (“[W]e can foresee instances when the market value of the property 
would not adequately reflect the victim’s loss or when the consideration of the percentage of depreciation would 
be inequitable . . . . Therefore, we hold that a court is not tied to fair market value as the sole standard for 
determining restitution amounts, but rather may exercise such discretion as required to further the purposes of 
restitution.” (footnotes omitted)). 
 32. Id. at 331–32. 
 33. Id. at 331. 
 34. Id. at 332 (citing Hawthorne v. State, 558 So. 2d 156, 157 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1990)). 
 35. Id. at 333. 
 36. Id. 
 37. See Hawthorne, 573 So. 2d at 333. 
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III.  METHODS AND PROBLEMS OF PROOF 
Despite the laudable efforts made by the Hawthorne court to limit the 
inequitable results that can undoubtedly occur when the State is required to 
establish precise measurements of loss, the requirements currently imposed by 
Florida law often make it extremely difficult, if not practically impossible, for the 
State to prove the victim’s loss.38 Regardless of which measurement of value is 
used, the methods available to the State for establishing the value of the victim’s 
property in a restitution hearing are limited. Moreover, as discussed below, each 
approach encounters problems due to the Florida Evidence Code.39 
A.   Fair Market Value 
1. Direct Evidence 
If the State seeks to establish fair market value via direct testimony, it can hire 
an expert witness to testify concerning the value of the property. However, hiring 
an expert witness to testify to fair market value involves considerable time and 
expense.40 In addition, when property is stolen or lost and the victim has little 
information regarding the date of purchase, original price, or other details of the 
property—such as when the victim receives the property as a gift—the expert will 
have a difficult time establishing his or her competency and reliability to opine as 
to the property’s value, as required by section 90.702, Florida Statutes.41 In such 
circumstances, the expert must accept the victim’s description of the property and 
speculate that a similar item has a certain value.42 However, Florida courts have 
found that such speculative expert testimony is insufficient to establish fair market 
value.43  
Another way for the State to establish fair market value via direct evidence is 
to present the testimony of the victim. As a practical matter, the victim is often the 
State’s best (if not only) witness. In Hawthorne, the court noted that “an owner of 
 ________________________  
 38. See, e.g., Phillips v. State, 141 So. 3d 702, 705 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2014) (per curiam) (“The fact that it 
was practically impossible for the victim to establish the restitution amount without relying on hearsay evidence 
appears to have caused an unjust result for the victim, because she and the state appear to have no other means by 
which to prove the restitution amount.”). 
 39. See infra note 48 and accompanying text. 
 40. Phillips, 141 So. 3d at 706. 
 41. Id.; see FLA. STAT. § 90.702 (2014) (“[A] witness qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, 
experience, training, or education may testify about it in the form of an opinion or otherwise, if: (1) The testimony 
is based upon sufficient facts or data; (2) The testimony is the product of reliable principles and methods; and (3) 
The witness has applied the principles and methods reliably to the facts of the case.”). 
 42. Phillips, 141 So. 3d at 706. 
 43. Id.; see, e.g., D.E.M. v. State, 109 So. 3d 1229, 1232 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2013) (“In the instant case, 
the victim testified that an appraiser gave him a ‘guesstimated value’ of $20,000 or $30,000 for the entire coin 
collection, from which the victim came up with the $20,000 figure. The record contains no supporting 
documentation or other predicate for this speculative opinion of the value of the lost coin collection. A mere 
estimate of value, without any evidentiary basis, is insufficient to prove an amount for restitution purposes.” 
(citation omitted)); see also FLA. STAT. § 90.705(2) (2014) (providing that if the defendant “establishes prima 
facie evidence that the expert does not have a sufficient basis for the opinion, the opinions and inferences of the 
expert are inadmissible unless the party offering the testimony establishes the underlying facts or data”). 
6
Barry Law Review, Vol. 20, Iss. 2 [2015], Art. 3
https://lawpublications.barry.edu/barrylrev/vol20/iss2/3
Spring 2015 Do You Know the Value of Your Property? 157 
 
property is generally qualified to testify as to the fair market value of his property,” 
whether or not the owner is qualified as an expert.44 This statement presumes that 
the owner has familiarity with the characteristics of the property, knowledge of its 
uses and purposes, and experience in dealing with it.45 Yet, that presumption is a 
“fragile” one.46 If it is not shown that the owner has knowledge of the property’s 
fair market value, Florida courts routinely hold that the victim’s mere opinion 
testimony of the value of his or her property is insufficient to establish the amount 
of restitution.47 Thus, unless the victim deals in the type of goods lost, stolen, or 
damaged, the victim is unlikely to be sufficiently qualified to provide the fair 
market value of his or her property. Of course, the cases in which a burglar takes 
art from the home of an art appraiser, an arsonist burns down the house of a realtor, 
or a robber takes a vehicle from a used-car salesperson are undeniably rare. 
Even when the victim makes a good-faith effort to learn the fair market value 
of his or her property prior to testifying, the victim’s opinion may still be 
inadmissible due to the rules of evidence.48 For example, at least one Florida court 
has noted that sometimes it is “practically impossible for the victim to establish the 
restitution amount without relying on hearsay evidence.”49 In theory, at least at its 
origination, a victim’s personal knowledge of the value of his or her property is 
usually based on some form of hearsay, such as a receipt,50 an appraisal or 
estimate,51 or the price in a store catalog or on a store website.52 However, because 
 ________________________  
 44. State v. Hawthorne, 573 So. 2d 330, 333 n.6 (Fla. 1991). 
 45. Sanchez v. State, 101 So. 3d 1283, 1286 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2012) (stating that “an owner, though 
presumed competent to testify to the value of stolen property, must demonstrate personal knowledge of the 
characteristics of the stolen property, such as the quality, cost, and condition of the property”); Craig v. Craig, 982 
So. 2d 724, 729 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2008) (quoting Sun Bank/N. Fla., N.A. v. Edmunds, 624 So. 2d 753, 756 (Fla. 
Dist. Ct. App. 1993)). 
 46. See Sanchez, 101 So. 3d at 1286 (“The competence presumed of an owner is fragile, and where the 
owner shows a lack of familiarity with the stolen property, the opinion evidence will not support a determination 
of value. . . . Rather than offering a bare opinion, an owner’s estimate of the value of stolen property must be 
supported by facts that show enough familiarity with the property to lend credence to the opinion.”); Craig, 982 
So. 2d at 729. 
 47. See, e.g., D.E.M., 109 So. 3d at 1232; Fernandez v. State, 98 So. 3d 730, 731 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2012) 
(finding that “the victim’s opinion alone was insufficient to support the amount awarded”); Bennett v. State, 944 
So. 2d 524, 526 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2006) (“A victim’s testimony, without documentation, is not enough to 
support an award of restitution.” (citing State v. Schuette, 782 So. 2d 935, 937 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2001))); see 
also 1 CHARLES W. EHRHARDT, EHRHARDT’S FLORIDA EVIDENCE § 701.1, at 713 (2013 ed.) (“An owner can 
testify to the value of his or her property although the witness is not qualified as an expert. Most decisions require 
the owner to have adequate knowledge upon which to base the opinion. Usually, mere ownership of property, 
however, does not automatically qualify an owner to testify as to the property’s value.”). 
 48. See, e.g., Phillips, 141 So. 3d at 705; see also infra note 54 and accompanying text; see generally 
EHRHARDT, supra note 47, at 707. 
 49. Phillips, 141 So. 3d at 705.  
 50. Twilegar v. State, 42 So. 3d 177, 199 (Fla. 2010) (stating that a receipt is hearsay if “admitted for the 
truth of the matters asserted (the dates of the purchases, the amounts, the locations, and whether the purchases 
were made in cash)”). 
 51. Leatherwood v. State, 108 So. 3d 1154, 1154–55 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2013) (holding that “an appraisal 
letter from a jeweler to establish the value of the stolen jewelry” was hearsay and was insufficient to establish the 
amount of restitution unless properly qualified as a business record); T.J.N. v. State, 977 So. 2d 770, 773 (Fla. 
Dist. Ct. App. 2008) (“When testimony concerning the estimated cost of repairs to damaged property is ‘offered in 
evidence to prove the truth of the matter asserted,’ it is ‘hearsay’ unless ‘made by the declarant while testifying at 
the trial or hearing.’”); Butler v. State, 970 So. 2d 919, 921 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2007) (“Because the written 
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there is no statutory exception to the general exclusion of hearsay in restitution 
proceedings,53 Florida courts have unanimously held that if the defense properly 
objects, hearsay evidence is generally inadmissible to determine the amount of 
restitution.54 Thus, because the owner must provide some predicate for the 
valuation he or she offers,55 and hearsay evidence is an insufficient basis for the 
owner’s opinion in Florida,56 many victims will not be sufficiently qualified to 
opine as to their property’s value.  
The general exclusion of hearsay does not mean that hearsay evidence is never 
admissible in a restitution hearing, however. Even when the defendant objects, if 
the hearsay evidence meets an exception to the general exclusion rule and has 
“some minimal indicia of reliability,” the hearsay evidence is likely admissible.57 
For example, “[w]ritten opinions or estimates may qualify as a business record 
  
estimate was inadmissible hearsay evidence, we hold that the trial court erred in admitting the estimate and basing 
the value of the exterior door solely on this evidence.”). 
 52. See Phillips, 141 So. 3d at 705 (“Here, the victim’s reliance on hearsay evidence from websites 
resembles a witness’s reliance on hearsay evidence from a catalog or contacts with non-witnesses, which courts 
have held cannot support the determination of a restitution amount.”); Gonzalez v. State, 40 So. 3d 86, 89 (Fla. 
Dist. Ct. App. 2010) (“Catalog prices alone are insufficient to establish a sufficient predicate.”); Ricci v. State, 550 
So. 2d 34, 36 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1989) (“[T]he price on the page from the jewelry catalog is inadmissible 
hearsay.”). 
 53. See FLA. STAT. § 90.802 (2014) (“Except as provided by statute, hearsay evidence is inadmissible.”). 
 54. See, e.g., T.J.N., 977 So. 2d at 773 (“Hearsay evidence may not be used to determine the amount of 
restitution when there is a proper objection by the defense to the hearsay evidence.”); Smith v. State, 941 So. 2d 
479, 480 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2006) (“We reverse and remand for a new restitution hearing because the State’s 
evidence was improperly based on hearsay.”); Johnson v. State, 856 So. 2d 1085, 1087 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2003) 
(noting that the testimony used to support the restitution award was improper, in part, because it was based on 
hearsay); Herrington v. State, 823 So. 2d 286, 286 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2002) (stating that the trial court erred in 
setting the amount of restitution based on hearsay evidence to which the defendant properly objected); Rae v. 
State, 638 So. 2d 597, 598 n.1 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1994) (“The trial court erroneously believed hearsay evidence 
was admissible in a restitution hearing. The general rule is that hearsay testimony is not admissible in a restitution 
hearing unless defense counsel fails to properly object to the evidence.”). The requirement of an objection by the 
defense is more of a preservation of error requirement than an additional requirement to the general rule excluding 
hearsay. See Molter v. State, 892 So. 2d 1115, 1117 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2004) (stating that the defendant “waived 
the hearsay objection by failing to raise it” (emphasis added)).  
 55. D.E.M. v. State, 109 So. 3d 1229, 1232 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2013) (stating that “the victim must have ‘a 
sufficient predicate’ on which to base an opinion regarding the value of the items taken”); Fino v. Nodine, 646 So. 
2d 746, 748–49 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1994) (“Before lay opinion testimony can be properly admitted, a predicate 
must be laid in which the witness testifies as to the facts or perceptions upon which the opinion is based.” (citation 
omitted)). 
 56. See generally EHRHARDT, supra note 47, at 707 (“Lay opinion based on hearsay evidence is not 
admissible.”). 
 57. See Box v. State, 993 So. 2d 135, 139 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2008); accord McKown v. State, 46 So. 3d 
174, 175 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2010). To the extent that the “minimal indicia of reliability” requirement has been 
interpreted by some courts as a “relaxed evidentiary standard in restitution hearings,” State v. Davis, 133 So. 3d 
1101, 1106 n.6 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2014), these courts are mistaken. It is in fact an additional requirement to the 
admission of hearsay at sentencing originally created by federal courts to safeguard defendants’ right to due 
process because the Confrontation Clause does not apply at sentencing. See Box, 993 So. 2d at 139 (“We 
acknowledge that despite the fact that Crawford does not apply to restitution hearings, the State is still not 
permitted to admit any and all hearsay. Rather, the trial court may only allow hearsay having some minimal indicia 
of reliability to be injected into the sentencing proceeding.” (citing United States v. Littlesun, 444 F.3d 1196, 
1199, 1200 (9th Cir. 2006))). It should also be noted that, in Box, the hearsay at issue was a “self-authenticating 
public record[]” and thus did not require an analysis of its admissibility under the Florida Evidence Code. Id. at 
136; see FLA. STAT. § 90.803(8) (2014) (providing that public records and reports are admissible hearsay “unless 
the sources of information or other circumstances show their lack of trustworthiness”). 
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exception to the hearsay rule under section 90.803(6), Florida Statutes . . . .”58 But 
for a written opinion or estimate to meet the business record exception, the 
production of estimates must be a regularly conducted business activity, and the 
State must either call a witness to lay the foundational requirements of section 
90.803(6) or establish the foundation by certification or declaration.59 Thus, 
because written opinions and estimates are unlikely to be self-authenticating, as 
noted above, the State must incur the additional time and expense of producing an 
additional witness to testify concerning the value of the victim’s property, and even 
then, the witness may not be sufficiently qualified or have enough information to 
form a reliable basis on which to opine.60 Indeed, Florida courts routinely reverse 
trial courts’ restitution awards because the State’s evidence failed to comply with 
the foundational requirements of section 90.803(6).61  
2. Indirect Evidence 
To establish fair market value indirectly, the State must present evidence of 
each of the following four factors: “(1) original market cost; (2) manner in which 
the item was used; (3) the general condition and quality of the item; and (4) the 
percentage of depreciation.”62 However, this approach undoubtedly requires the 
testimony of the victim, another witness, or both,63 and thus encounters the same 
evidentiary requirements mentioned above.64 For example, if the victim received 
the property by gift or inheritance, as is often the case with jewelry, the victim may 
not be able to testify to the original market cost without speculating or relying on 
hearsay.65 In such circumstances, even if an appraiser is hired, he or she will not be 
 ________________________  
 58. Butler v. State, 970 So. 2d 919, 920 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2007). 
 59. Id. at 920–21. 
 60. See supra notes 40–43 and accompanying text. 
 61. See, e.g., Leatherwood v. State, 108 So. 3d 1154, 1154–55 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2013) (“Over 
Leatherwood’s objections, the State sought to introduce an appraisal letter from a jeweler to establish the value of 
the stolen jewelry. However, the State failed to properly qualify the letter as a business record pursuant to section 
90.803(6) and section 90.902(11), Florida Statutes (2012).”); McKown, 46 So. 3d at 175  (“While the victim had 
her bank statements with her in court, a predicate was not laid for their authenticity or reliability . . . . Without 
laying that foundation, the evidence is inadmissible hearsay.”); Moore v. State, 47 So. 3d 387, 388 (Fla. Dist. Ct. 
App. 2010) (reversing the trial court’s restitution order where the victim “provided testimony regarding the prices 
she paid for the items she purchased, estimates on the items she received as gifts, and a business card on which an 
employee of a jewelry store had listed the values of the pieces of jewelry she purchased from that store”); T.J.N. v. 
State, 977 So. 2d 770, 773 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2008) (reversing the trial court’s restitution award where the “State 
presented the testimony of the insurance adjustor regarding the estimated cost of repairs to the damage on the right 
side of the truck,” and “the insurance adjustor revealed that he was basing his testimony on an estimate he had 
received from an auto body shop”); House v. State, 614 So. 2d 677, 677 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1993) (reversing the 
trial court’s restitution order because “[m]uch of the documentary evidence on which the state relied was subject to 
the hearsay rule and failed to meet the strict requirements for admissibility under the ‘business records’ exception, 
on which the state relied”). 
 62. State v. Hawthorne, 573 So. 2d 330, 332 (Fla. 1991). 
 63. The victim will often be the only witness who can testify to the manner in which the property was used 
and the general condition and quality of the property, for example. 
 64. See supra Part III.A.1. 
 65. See Moore, 47 So. 3d at 388 (“The victim’s testimony regarding what the jewelry store’s employee told 
her regarding the estimated value of the unrecovered jewelry was improperly admitted hearsay. Additionally, the 
victim’s testimony regarding the items she received as gifts was also insufficient to establish the items’ values 
because the victim did not provide testimony of her own knowledge or opinion regarding the values.” (citation 
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able to opine as to the item’s original market cost without knowing the details of 
the item.66 Furthermore, as in Hawthorne, many victims will have a difficult time 
providing the percentage of their property’s depreciation because such knowledge 
is typically outside the scope of most laypeople’s experience.67 Yet, if the State 
fails to prove with specificity the percentage of depreciation and the trial court 
makes a good-faith effort to depreciate the item, the appellate court will reverse the 
restitution award because it is error for the court to “arbitrarily” depreciate an 
item.68  
B.   “Fair Amount” Value 
“Fair amount” value is a more relaxed standard for measuring the victim’s loss 
because it allows the court to consider “any appropriate factor” in determining the 
amount of restitution to award.69 However, even when the trial court uses the “fair 
amount” standard to determine the victim’s loss, the rules of evidence still apply.70 
Consequently, the court’s consideration of any appropriate factor is limited by what 
evidence the State can present in accordance with the rules.  
Moreover, these cases are rare because, as the court noted in Hawthorne, “in 
most instances the victim’s loss and the fair market value of the property at the 
time of the offense will be the same.”71 Consequently, the State must prove fair 
market value in the majority of cases.72 Therefore, more often than not, the State is 
faced with the dilemma of either spending considerable time and expense to prove 
  
omitted)); Peters v. State, 555 So. 2d 450, 451 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1990) (“Absent a sufficient predicate showing a 
basis for such an opinion, the mere opinion of the victims as to the value of their lost property, as here, is 
insufficient to establish that value. Even less is it sufficient when, again as here, the victims’ opinions to a large 
extent were ‘estimates.’”); Abbott v. State, 543 So. 2d 411, 412 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1989) (reversing the trial 
court’s restitution order where “[t]he witness’ estimated figure was arrived at by considering the cost to replace the 
jewelry, relying on purchase receipts, a partial appraisal, magazines, and recent purchases of gold,” and where 
“she conceded her lack of knowledge of current market value”). 
 66. See supra notes 41–43 and accompanying text. 
 67. See Hawthorne, 573 So. 2d at 332. 
 68. Thompson v. State, 68 So. 3d 425, 427 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2011) (“Application of such an arbitrary 
percentage of depreciation, without an explanation or record support, was an abuse of discretion.”); Kiefer v. State, 
909 So. 2d 572, 574 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2005) (stating “there must be sufficient evidence in the record to support 
application of a depreciation rate”).  
 69. See Glaubius v. State, 688 So. 2d 913, 915 (Fla. 1997) (stating that “the trial court has discretion to take 
into account any appropriate factor in arriving at a fair amount which will adequately compensate a victim for his 
or her loss and further the purposes of restitution”). 
 70. See State v. Davis, 133 So. 3d 1101, 1106 n.6 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2014) (“Although federal law 
explicitly provides that the federal rules of evidence do not apply at sentencing proceedings, the Florida Evidence 
Code contains no such parallel provision.” (citation omitted)). 
 71. Hawthorne, 573 So. 2d at 333. 
 72. See id. (“Where it is determined that a restitution amount equal to fair market value adequately 
compensates the victim or otherwise serves the purposes of restitution, we agree with the court below that the 
value should be established either through direct testimony or through evidence of the four factors announced in 
Negron.” (footnote omitted)); Fletcher v. State, 800 So. 2d 309, 310 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2001) (“Although courts 
are not bound to utilize the fair market value method of valuation and may exercise such discretion as is required 
to further the purposes of restitution, fair market value is to be used where it would adequately compensate the 
victim. Absent evidence that the item taken was a family heirloom or a new automobile, for which fair market 
value would not adequately compensate the victim, fair market value is the valuation method to be used.” (citation 
omitted)). 
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the value of something that was unjustly taken from the victim or allowing the 
victim to walk away empty-handed for a second time.73 
IV.  THE FOURTH DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL’S PROPOSAL 
Unfortunately, when the State cannot prove the amount of a victim’s loss, it 
causes unjust results that conflict with the purposes of restitution proceedings. For 
example, in Phillips v. State, the defendant stole several items of jewelry from the 
victim.74 However, because the victim did not purchase many of the items, she did 
not have “first-hand knowledge of the [jewelry’s] purchase date, original value, or 
quality.”75 As a result, to determine the fair market value of her jewelry, the victim 
conducted online research, located three or four pieces that were similar, and 
averaged their prices.76 Following a restitution hearing in which she testified to the 
average prices of all of her stolen jewelry, the trial court ordered the defendant to 
pay restitution to the victim in the amount of $20,511, the total of her averages.77 
On appeal, the Fourth District Court of Appeal of Florida (“Fourth DCA”) 
reversed and remanded for a new evidentiary hearing, finding that as the law 
currently exists, “the victim’s reliance on hearsay evidence from websites was 
insufficient to establish the restitution amount.”78 But in doing so, the court 
acknowledged that establishing the restitution amount without relying on hearsay 
was “practically impossible” and that reversal “appears to have caused an unjust 
result for the victim, because she and the state appear to have no other means by 
which to prove the restitution amount” on remand.79  
In addition, the court recognized that other Florida courts recently reversed 
restitution awards, leaving “wholly innocent person[s] . . . with a more difficult, if 
not impossible, path to recover their stolen items’ value.”80 Accordingly, the Fourth 
DCA recommended that the Florida Legislature revisit section 775.089 and 
“consider providing trial courts with wider discretion in setting the restitution 
amount.”81 Specifically, the court recommended adding the following language to 
section 775.089(7): “The court is not bound by fair market value as the sole 
standard for determining restitution amounts, but rather may exercise such 
discretion as required to further the purposes of restitution, including consideration 
of hearsay.”82  
When broken down, the Fourth DCA’s recommendation has three components. 
First, it explicitly states that the court is not required to use fair market value to 
 ________________________  
 73. See supra Part III.A. 
 74. Phillips v. State, 141 So. 3d 702, 703 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2014) (per curiam). 
 75. Id. at 705. 
 76. Id. at 703. 
 77. Id. at 704–05. 
 78. Id. at 705. 
 79. Id. 
 80. Phillips, 141 So. 3d at 706. 
 81. Id. 
 82. Id. In Schenk v. State, a case similar to Phillips, the Fifth District Court of Appeal of Florida 
subsequently joined the Fourth DCA’s recommendation. Schenk v. State, 150 So. 3d 275, 276 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 
2014). 
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measure the victim’s loss.83 Second, it provides the court with discretion necessary 
“to further the purposes of restitution” in determining restitution amounts.84 Third, 
it permits the use of hearsay evidence in restitution proceedings.85  
A.   Advantages 
From a public policy standpoint, there are significant advantages and only 
minor disadvantages to adopting the Fourth DCA’s more relaxed framework to 
measuring and proving the amount of the victim’s loss in a restitution hearing. One 
advantage is that it would alleviate onerous requirements of proof in restitution 
hearings. Importantly, restitution is a post-adjudication sentencing proceeding.86 
Therefore, the defendant’s guilt has already been stipulated to or determined 
beyond a reasonable doubt. In adopting section 775.089, it is unlikely that the 
Florida Legislature intended to turn sentencing proceedings into “complicated, 
prolonged trials of the normal civil variety.”87 Instead, restitution proceedings 
should be “expedient and reasonable, with uncertainties resolved with a view 
toward achieving fairness to the victim.”88 By giving the trial court broader 
discretion in determining restitution amounts, and by allowing hearsay evidence to 
prove the amount of loss sustained by the victim, the Fourth DCA’s proposal will 
save the State, the courts, and the victim considerable time and expense at 
sentencing. 
Furthermore, while victims of crime may still pursue a damages award in a 
separate, civil lawsuit,89 the Florida Legislature specifically adopted the restitution 
statute for the benefit of crime victims.90 Restitution is “intended to provide an 
additional alternative to reimburse a crime victim, over and above traditional 
 ________________________  
 83. Phillips, 141 So. 3d at 706–07. 
 84. Id. 
 85. Id. 
 86. See White v. State, 21 So. 3d 77, 79 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2009) (“A restitution hearing is part of 
sentencing and requires the presence of counsel.” (citing Moment v. State, 645 So. 2d 502, 503 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 
1994))); Kittelson v. State, 980 So. 2d 533, 535 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2008) (stating that “[r]estitution is a mandated 
part of sentencing”). 
 87. Cf. United States v. Gordon, 393 F.3d 1044, 1060 (9th Cir. 2004) (Fernandez, J., concurring and 
dissenting); Dolan v. United States, 560 U.S. 605, 613 (2010) (stating that a federal restitution “statute seeks speed 
primarily to help the victims of crime and only secondarily to help the defendant”); United States v. Faxon, 689 F. 
Supp. 2d 1344, 1356 (S.D. Fla. 2010) (stating that restitution “is not a civil matter even though restitution 
resembles a judgment for the benefit of a particular victim”). 
 88. Gordon, 393 F.3d at 1048 (majority opinion); see also United States v. Balentine, 569 F.3d 801, 804 
(8th Cir. 2009) (stating that “the procedural requirements of [restitution statutes] are intended to protect victims, 
‘not the victimizers’” (quoting United States v. Grimes, 173 F.3d 634, 639 (7th Cir. 1999))); Dohrmann v. United 
States, 442 F.3d 1279, 1281 (11th Cir. 2006) (holding that “Apprendi does not apply to a restitution order”); cf. 
Norman v. State, 468 So. 2d 1063, 1065–66 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1985) (Nimmons, J., concurring and dissenting) 
(“The same rigidities in proof of value which are required of the state in the trial of criminal cases involving value 
as an essential element of the crime should not, in my view, always be imposed in the determination of an 
appropriate amount of restitution.”). 
 89. FLA. STAT. § 775.089(8) (2014) (“An order of restitution hereunder will not bar any subsequent civil 
remedy or recovery, but the amount of such restitution shall be set off against any subsequent independent civil 
recovery.”). 
 90. State v. Hitchmon, 678 So. 2d 460, 462 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1996). 
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remedies like a civil lawsuit.”91 However, holding the State to the same 
requirements of those in a full-fledged civil lawsuit undermines the primary 
purpose of restitution because it makes it less likely that the victim will be 
compensated for their loss.92 As one Florida judge explained, “the goal of the 
criminal justice system should be to strive to allow full compensation to victims—
not to make them victims twice.”93 Thus, adopting the Fourth DCA’s 
recommendation would not only save considerable time and money, it would also 
limit unjust results by better serving the primary purpose of the restitution statute.94 
Adopting the Fourth DCA’s suggestion would also give the trial court the 
discretion it needs to establish a restitution amount that adequately instills upon the 
defendant the consequences of his or her actions.95 Mandatory restitution is an 
important aspect of sentencing defendants, in part, because it “impress[es] upon 
offenders that their conduct produces concrete and devastating harms for real, 
identifiable victims.”96 Moreover, the secondary purpose of restitution is “to serve 
the rehabilitative, deterrent, and retributive goals of the criminal justice system.”97 
The Supreme Court of Florida previously recognized that “[t]he trial court is best 
able to determine how imposing restitution may best serve those goals in each 
case.”98  
However, the current state of the law severely limits the trial court’s ability to 
determine an appropriate restitution amount at sentencing. Florida Rule of Criminal 
Procedure 3.720(b) provides that “[t]he court shall entertain submissions and 
evidence by the parties that are relevant to the sentence.”99 To the extent that 
restitution is an important aspect of sentencing,100 hearsay evidence is often 
relevant to the defendant’s sentence because, as mentioned above, it is helpful, and 
sometimes necessary, to determine the amount of loss sustained by the victim as a 
 ________________________  
 91. Id. (citing Spivey v. State, 531 So. 2d 965, 967 (Fla. 1988)). 
 92. See Paroline v. United States, 134 S. Ct. 1710, 1724 (2014) (“Aside from the manifest procedural 
differences between criminal sentencing and civil tort lawsuits, restitution serves purposes that differ from (though 
they overlap with) the purposes of tort law. Legal fictions developed in the law of torts cannot be imported into 
criminal restitution and applied to their utmost limits without due consideration of these differences.” (citation 
omitted)); supra Part III. 
 93. Thompson v. State, 68 So. 3d 425, 427 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2011) (Polen, J., concurring). 
 94. See Santana v. State, 795 So. 2d 1112, 1113 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2001) (“The primary objectives of 
restitution awards pursuant to section 775.089 are to give the criminal defendant an opportunity to make amends 
and to make the victim of a crime whole, at least to the extent it is possible to do so.”). 
 95. Cf. Paroline, 134 S. Ct. at 1729 (“District courts routinely exercise wide discretion both in sentencing 
as a general matter and more specifically in fashioning restitution orders.”); id. at 1734 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting) 
(“It is true that district courts exercise substantial discretion in awarding restitution and imposing sentences in 
general.”).  
 96. Id. at 1727 (majority opinion). 
 97. Glaubius v. State, 688 So. 2d 913, 915 (Fla. 1997).  
 98. Spivey v. State, 531 So. 2d 965, 967 (Fla. 1988); see also Noel v. State, 127 So. 3d 769, 774, 778 (Fla. 
Dist. Ct. App. 2013) (recognizing that “restitution to victims is a central ‘penological interest’ of Florida criminal 
law,” and concluding that it was not a denial of due process for the trial court to give the defendant “the 
opportunity to mitigate ‘the severity of an otherwise appropriate sentence’ by paying restitution to the victims in 
an amount he indicated he could afford”), review granted, 153 So. 3d 907 (Fla. 2014) (unpublished table decision). 
 99. FLA. R. CRIM. P. 3.720(b); see also State v. Davis, 133 So. 3d 1101, 1106 n.6 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2014) 
(stating that rule 3.720(b) “does not define the term ‘submissions’ and neither expressly permits nor prohibits the 
admission of hearsay evidence”). 
 100. See supra notes 96–97 and accompanying text. 
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result of the defendant’s criminal offense.101 Section 775.089 in fact requires the 
court to consider the amount of the victim’s loss in determining whether to order 
any restitution at all.102 Nonetheless, although hearsay evidence is admissible in 
other sentencing proceedings in Florida, such as probation revocation hearings103 
and capital sentencing proceedings,104 hearsay is still inadmissible in restitution 
hearings.105 As a result, when the State cannot prove the amount of the victim’s 
loss without relying on hearsay, the court cannot order the defendant to pay 
restitution, and the defendant may not appreciate the full effect of his illegal acts.  
Relatedly, once the court has determined that monetary restitution is 
appropriate in an individual case, it should have broad discretion in fashioning a 
restitution order.106 In Hawthorne, the court held that the trial court is not tied to 
fair market value as the sole standard for measuring the victim’s loss, but rather, it 
“may exercise such discretion as required to further the purposes of restitution.”107 
However, the court limited its holding to instances when fair market value is an 
inappropriate measure of the victim’s loss.108 Therefore, in most instances, the trial 
court must use fair market value to determine the amount of the victim’s loss, 
which means that the State must present a witness with personal knowledge of the 
fair market value of the victim’s loss, or the State must present evidence of all four 
fair market value factors.109 
While the holding in Hawthorne certainly improved the law governing 
restitution proceedings, it failed to address instances when fair market value may 
adequately reflect the victim’s loss, but the State is unable to meet the demanding 
criteria to prove fair market value. In such circumstances, the victim is left without 
recourse, and the defendant receives a windfall for his actions. Rather than give the 
court broad discretion in rare instances when fair market value is inappropriate to 
measure the victim’s loss, the court should have discretion to take into account any 
appropriate factor in all instances.110 The Fourth DCA’s recommendation simply 
 ________________________  
 101. See supra notes 49–52, 55 and accompanying text. 
 102. FLA. STAT. § 775.089(6)(a) (2014). 
 103. Russell v. State, 982 So. 2d 642, 646 (Fla. 2008) (“It is undisputed that hearsay evidence is admissible 
in a probation revocation hearing to prove a violation of probation.”). 
 104. FLA. STAT. § 921.141(1) (2014) (“Any such evidence which the court deems to have probative value 
may be received, regardless of its admissibility under the exclusionary rules of evidence, provided the defendant is 
accorded a fair opportunity to rebut any hearsay statements.”). 
 105. See sources cited supra notes 53–54. 
 106. Paroline v. United States, 134 S. Ct. 1710, 1727–28 (2014) (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 3664(a)); see source 
cited supra note 95. 
 107. State v. Hawthorne, 573 So. 2d 330, 333 (Fla. 1991). 
 108. See id. (“Where it is determined that a restitution amount equal to fair market value adequately 
compensates the victim or otherwise serves the purposes of restitution, we agree with the court below that the 
value should be established either through direct testimony or through evidence of the four factors announced in 
Negron.” (footnote omitted)). 
 109. See id. (“We recognize that in most instances the victim’s loss and the fair market value of the property 
at the time of the offense will be the same.”); supra Part III.A. 
 110. See Paroline, 134 S. Ct. at 1728 (“There are a variety of factors district courts might consider in 
determining a proper amount of restitution, and it is neither necessary nor appropriate to prescribe a precise 
algorithm for determining the proper restitution amount at this point in the law’s development. Doing so would 
unduly constrain the decisionmakers closest to the facts of any given case.”); United States v. Boccagna, 450 F.3d 
107, 116 (2d Cir. 2006) (“Notwithstanding the general reliability of fair market value as a measure of property 
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adopts the approach taken in Hawthorne, but permits it in all circumstances. This is 
a reasonable approach considering the fact that case law subsequent to Hawthorne 
suggests that the defendant can easily defeat the State’s presentation of evidence 
concerning fair market value by objecting to hearsay or speculation, or by noting 
that not all of the factors pertaining to fair market value have been proved by 
competent, substantial evidence.111  
B.   Disadvantages 
A disadvantage of the Fourth DCA’s recommendation is that it failed to 
provide an alternative measure of the victim’s loss. Although the Fourth DCA 
reiterated the holding in Hawthorne that the trial court is not tied to “fair market 
value as the sole standard for determining restitution amounts,”112 it did not say 
what standard the court should use when fair market value is not used. 
Nevertheless, case law subsequent to Hawthorne established that “fair amount” 
value is the appropriate, alternative measure to fair market value.113 As with 
replacement value and retail value, “fair amount” value may ultimately be the same 
as fair market value.114 Yet, the method of proof of “fair amount” value is much 
more conducive to accomplishing the purposes of restitution because it is 
intentionally broad and allows the court to consider any appropriate factor in 
determining the amount of restitution to award.115 Thus, the fact that the Fourth 
DCA did not provide an alternative measure of value should not prevent adoption 
of the Fourth DCA’s proposal; “fair amount” value is implicitly the measure of 
value under the Fourth DCA’s proposal. 
A related disadvantage of the Fourth DCA’s proposal is that without a definite 
standard to guide the court’s determination of the victim’s loss, the trial court may 
appear to have too much discretion, which may result in a windfall for the victim. 
However, at least in theft cases, it is highly unlikely that a trial court’s restitution 
award would exceed any possible judgment in a civil action because, in a civil 
  
value, in some circumstances other measures of value may more accurately serve the statutory purpose to ensure a 
crime victim’s recovery of the full amount of his loss.”). 
 111. See, e.g., Hunter v. State, 48 So. 3d 174, 176 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2010) (“The trial court erred in 
establishing the amount of restitution because the victim could not identify all of the items that had been taken, 
relied on hearsay evidence to establish value, and failed to take into account depreciation.”); Mansingh v. State, 
588 So. 2d 636, 638 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1991) (reversing the trial court’s restitution order “because the state 
presented evidence on only one of the [Negron] four factors”); see also Thompson v. State, 68 So. 3d 425, 427 
(Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2011) (Polen, J., concurring) (stating that “objections of hearsay as to sources of information 
as to value [and the] absence of receipts for items bought years earlier” “make it more difficult for a victim to 
prove the ‘fair market value’ of their stolen property”); cf. Matthew C. Lucas, Valuing the Marital Home, 88, no.4 
FLA. B.J., 8, 9 (2014) (stating that “[d]ivining the most probable price for a property’s fair market value poses an 
interesting challenge in the law” in part because “the analysis inherently requires elements of speculation”). 
 112. Hawthorne, 573 So. 2d at 333. 
 113. See Glaubius v. State, 688 So. 2d 913, 915 (Fla. 1997). 
 114. See supra notes 23–24, 26 and accompanying text. 
 115. See Glaubius, 688 So. 2d at 915; supra text accompanying note 31. Importantly, section 775.089, 
Florida Statutes, is not subject to a void-for-vagueness challenge because it does not penalize any conduct. See 
State v. Brake, 796 So. 2d 522, 527 (Fla. 2001) (“In order for a criminal statute to withstand a void-for-vagueness 
challenge, the language of the statute must provide adequate notice of the conduct it prohibits when measured by 
common understanding and practice.”). 
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action, the victim may claim treble damages and attorneys’ fees in addition to the 
property loss.116 Moreover, safeguards in the law already protect against trial courts 
abusing their discretion. For example, even when the court uses “fair amount” 
value to determine the victim’s loss, the trial court’s restitution order must still be 
supported by competent, substantial evidence.117 In addition, the trial court may 
only award restitution in an amount causally connected to the defendant’s crime.118 
Thus, even with more discretion, courts would not be able to award restitution in an 
arbitrary amount that favors the victim at the expense of the defendant’s right to 
due process.119  
Moreover, while the purpose of restitution is not to create a windfall for the 
victim,120 it is certainly not to create one for the defendant either. In other contexts, 
Florida laws are much more forgiving where one party is the cause of a lack of 
evidence favorable to the other party. For example, section 90.804, Florida 
Statutes, provides that hearsay evidence is admissible if the opposing party 
“wrongfully caused, or acquiesced in wrongfully causing, the declarant’s 
unavailability as a witness, and did so intending that result.”121 Case law provides 
that criminal charges must be dismissed if the prosecution destroys exculpatory 
evidence in bad faith.122 There are even independent causes of action, both civil 
and criminal, for intentionally destroying evidence that hinders the opposing 
party’s ability to prove its case.123 The principle that supports all of these laws is 
that the party responsible for the intentional destruction of evidence should not 
benefit from its bad-faith actions, and the party relying on the evidence should not 
be penalized for the bad-faith acts of another. Similarly, in the context of restitution 
proceedings, the State has proven or the defendant concedes that he has wrongfully 
caused loss or damage to property that could otherwise be used to determine its 
value. Thus, in light of the aforementioned principle, the law should be less 
concerned with providing windfalls to victims, and more tolerant of victims’ 
inability to testify to the amount of restitution when their inability is due largely to 
 ________________________  
 116. See S.M. v. State, 159 So. 3d 966, 968 n.1 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2015) (citing FLA. STAT. § 772.11(1), 
(2012)). 
 117. See supra note 18 and accompanying text. 
 118. See supra note 11 and accompanying text. 
 119. See supra note 17 and accompanying text. 
 120. Glaubius, 688 So. 2d at 916. 
 121. FLA. STAT. § 90.804(f) (2014). 
 122. State v. Milo, 596 So. 2d 722, 723 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1992) (“Willful, intentional destruction of 
evidence requires sanctions. Bad faith destruction of evidence requires dismissal of the charges.” (citing Louissaint 
v. State, 576 So. 2d 316 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1990))). 
 123. See FLA. STAT. § 918.13 (2014) (providing that it is a third-degree felony for any “person, knowing 
that a criminal trial or proceeding or an investigation by a duly constituted prosecuting authority, law enforcement 
agency, grand jury or legislative committee of this state is pending or is about to be instituted, [to] . . . [a]lter, 
destroy, conceal, or remove any record, document, or thing with the purpose to impair its verity or availability in 
such proceeding or investigation”); Royal & Sunalliance v. Lauderdale Marine Ctr., 877 So. 2d 843, 845 (Fla. 
Dist. Ct. App. 2004) (“The essential elements of a [civil] spoliation of evidence claim are: ‘(1) existence of a 
potential civil action, (2) a legal or contractual duty to preserve evidence which is relevant to the potential civil 
action, (3) destruction of that evidence, (4) significant impairment in the ability to prove the lawsuit, (5) a causal 
relationship between the evidence destruction and the inability to prove the lawsuit, and (6) damages.’” (quoting 
Hagopian v. Publix Supermarkets, Inc., 788 So. 2d 1088, 1091 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2001))).  
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no fault of their own. The Fourth DCA’s suggestion simply acknowledges this 
principle by alleviating strict requirements of proof in a restitution hearing. 
Another potential disadvantage of the Fourth DCA’s suggestion concerns the 
admission of hearsay. When hearsay is permissible as the only evidence offered to 
support the trial court’s award of restitution, the result may be questionable. For 
example, whether due to poor memory, improper incentive, or other reasons, 
victims may exaggerate the true value of their property.124 The reliability of 
evidence is in fact the core concern underlying the general exclusion of hearsay 
evidence.125 
Concern for the reliability of hearsay evidence should not prevent adoption of 
the Fourth DCA’s proposal, however, because Florida courts already require that 
for hearsay to be admissible, it must contain “some minimal indicia of 
reliability.”126 In addition, not all hearsay is a verbal assertion by the witness. In 
many instances, the State offers documentary evidence of value, which is generally 
considered more reliable than oral hearsay,127 and is verifiable by the defendant and 
the court, but the evidence is nevertheless turned away due to the general exclusion 
of hearsay in restitution proceedings.128 In such circumstances, if the trial court 
finds the documentary evidence to be sufficiently reliable, it is unclear why the 
victim or the State is nonetheless required to incur the expense and inconvenience 
of presenting an additional witness to recount what is already stated in the 
document. 
A related disadvantage of allowing hearsay, including documentary hearsay, is 
that the defendant may not have the opportunity to cross-examine the declarant on 
matters such as the declarant’s qualifications and his or her methods or factors used 
to value the property.129 However, this concern should also not prevent adoption of 
the Fourth DCA’s proposal for at least two reasons. First, at least one Florida court 
has previously concluded that the Sixth Amendment’s Confrontation Clause “does 
not apply in restitution hearings because restitution proceedings are an aspect of 
 ________________________  
 124. Schering Corp. v. Pfizer Inc., 189 F.3d 218, 232 (2d Cir.), as amended on reh’g, (Sept. 29, 1999) (“The 
hearsay rule is generally said to exclude out-of-court statements offered for the truth of the matter asserted because 
there are four classes of risk peculiar to this kind of evidence: those of (1) insincerity, (2) faulty perception, (3) 
faulty memory and (4) faulty narration, each of which decreases the reliability of the inference from the statement 
made to the conclusion for which it is offered.” (citations omitted)). 
 125. See id.; Lee v. Illinois, 476 U.S. 530, 543 (1986) (stating that hearsay evidence that “does not fall 
within ‘a firmly rooted hearsay exception’ . . . is thus presumptively unreliable”). 
 126. Box v. State, 993 So. 2d 135, 139 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2008); accord McKown v. State, 46 So. 3d 174, 
175 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2010). 
 127. See United States v. Redd, 318 F.3d 778, 784 (8th Cir. 2003) (“Documentary hearsay evidence 
generally provides greater indicia of reliability than oral hearsay. This distinction is reflected in numerous long-
standing exceptions to the hearsay rule.”). 
 128. See, e.g., Butler v. State, 970 So. 2d 919, 921 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2007) (“Because the written estimate 
was inadmissible hearsay evidence, we hold that the trial court erred in admitting the estimate and basing the value 
of the exterior door solely on this evidence.”). 
 129. See Hochstadt v. Sanctuary Homeowner’s Ass’n, Inc., 761 So. 2d 1163, 1165 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2000) 
(stating that “the opinion of the appraiser as a witness would be subject to cross-examination as to qualifications, 
as well as in other areas, and that safeguard alleviates the concerns we have about admitting only the records”); see 
also BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 838 (10th ed. 2014) (stating that “[t]he chief reasons for the [hearsay] rule are 
that out-of-court statements amounting to hearsay are not made under oath and are not subject to cross-
examination”). 
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sentencing.”130 Therefore, the defendant does not have a constitutional right to 
confront witnesses against him in a restitution hearing.131  
Second, the trial court’s ability to discern truth from falsity and to assign 
weight to evidence in a restitution hearing should not be underestimated or 
substituted. For the same reason appellate courts defer to the trial court’s 
determinations of facts in general, the trial court’s decisions concerning the 
credibility of witnesses and the weight to give to evidence in restitution 
proceedings should not be second-guessed on appeal.132 While sitting as trier of 
fact, the trial court is in the best position to evaluate the victim’s testimony or other 
evidence offered by the State.133 Moreover, even when hearsay is admissible in a 
restitution proceeding, the defendant may cross-examine any witness that does 
testify and may introduce contrary evidence—including reliable hearsay 
evidence—in his or her defense.134 Thus, with these considerations in mind, the 
admissibility of hearsay in a restitution proceeding should not prevent the adoption 
of the Fourth DCA’s recommendation. 
C.   Comparison to the Federal Approach 
The federal system governing restitution proceedings offers a great example of 
how the Fourth DCA’s suggestion has been successfully implemented without 
losing sight of the concerns mentioned above.135 In both the federal and Florida 
system, the purposes of restitution and the burden of proof are the same.136 
 ________________________  
 130. Box v. State, 993 So. 2d 135, 139 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2008). The court also reiterated that “the State is 
still not permitted to admit any and all hearsay” and that “the trial court may only allow hearsay having some 
minimal indicia of reliability.” Id. 
 131. Id. 
 132. See Shaw v. Shaw, 334 So. 2d 13, 16 (Fla. 1976) (“It is clear that the function of the trial court is to 
evaluate and weigh the testimony and evidence based upon its observation of the bearing, demeanor and credibility 
of the witnesses appearing in the cause. It is not the function of the appellate court to substitute its judgment for 
that of the trial court through re-evaluation of the testimony and evidence from the record on appeal before it. The 
test . . . is whether the judgment of the trial court is supported by competent evidence. Subject to the appellate 
court’s right to reject ‘inherently incredible and improbable testimony or evidence,’ it is not the prerogative of an 
appellate court, upon a de novo consideration of the record, to substitute its judgment for that of the trial court.” 
(footnote omitted)). 
 133. See Stephens v. State, 748 So. 2d 1028, 1034 (Fla. 1999) (“We recognize and honor the trial court’s 
superior vantage point in assessing the credibility of witnesses and in making findings of fact. The deference that 
appellate courts afford findings of fact based on competent, substantial evidence is an important principle of 
appellate review.” (citations omitted)); see, e.g., Henry v. State, 840 So. 2d 1170, 1171 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2003) 
(stating that the trial court concluded that the defendant’s testimony concerning the amount of money she 
misappropriated “lacked credibility”). 
 134. See Del Valle v. State, 80 So. 3d 999, 1020 (Fla. 2011) (Lewis, J., dissenting) (“A defendant has the 
ability to defeat the imposition of a restitution order, or the amount, if he or she successfully contests the validity 
of any damage or loss allegedly caused to a victim by the defendant’s crime.”); Faurisma v. State, 61 So. 3d 497, 
497–98 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2011 ) (per curiam) (reversing the trial court’s restitution order because the defendant 
was not given an opportunity to be heard). 
 135. Restitution in the federal system is governed in large part by the Mandatory Victim Restitution Act, 18 
U.S.C. § 3663A (2012), and the Victim and Witness Protection Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3663 (2008). 
 136. Compare Paroline v. United States, 134 S. Ct. 1710, 1726 (2014) (“The primary goal of restitution is 
remedial or compensatory, but it also serves punitive purposes.” (citation omitted)), and United States v. Bourne, 
130 F.3d 1444, 1447 (11th Cir. 1997) (citing 18 U.S.C. § 3664(d)) (“The burden of proof for establishing 
restitution is upon the government by a preponderance of the evidence.”), with  Glaubius v. State, 688 So. 2d 913, 
915 (Fla. 1997) (“We have previously determined that the purpose of restitution is two-fold: It acts to (1) 
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However, similar to the Fourth DCA’s proposal, under the federal approach, trial 
courts are given much broader discretion in determining the appropriate amount of 
restitution, requiring only that there be a “reasonable approximation” of value.137 
Additionally, hearsay evidence is admissible in federal restitution hearings because 
the Federal Rules of Evidence do not apply to sentencing proceedings.138  
Nevertheless, to resolve the “tension . . . between the more lax evidentiary 
standards at sentencing—including allowing hearsay—and a defendant’s right not 
to be sentenced based on inaccurate information,” unlike under the Fourth DCA’s 
proposal, federal case law requires that for hearsay to be admissible in a restitution 
hearing, the defendant must be given an opportunity to refute the evidence, and the 
evidence must bear a “minimal indicia of reliability.”139 Thus, the federal system 
offers a very reasonable approach to restitution proceedings that successfully 
balances the purposes of restitution while maintaining the integrity of the judicial 
system and providing due process to the defendant.140 If the Florida Legislature 
desires to limit the inequitable results that inevitably occur under the current law in 
  
compensate the victim and (2) serve the rehabilitative, deterrent, and retributive goals of the criminal justice 
system.”), and Box, 993 So. 2d at 136 (“It is the burden of the State to prove the amount of loss for restitution 
purposes by a preponderance of the evidence.” (citing H.L.C. v. State, 950 So. 2d 1268, 1269 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 
2007))). 
 137. United States v. Kearney, 672 F.3d 81, 100–01 (1st Cir. 2012) (“In calculating the dollar figure owed in 
restitution, the court need only make a ‘reasonable determination of appropriate restitution.’ ‘Absolute precision’ 
is not required. Moreover, the district court has leeway to ‘resolve uncertainties with a view towards achieving 
fairness to the victim.’ Other circuits also recognize that ‘some degree of approximation’ is acceptable . . . and that 
‘mathematical precision’ is not required.” (internal quotation marks omitted)), cert. dismissed, 133 S. Ct. 1521 
(U.S. 2013); United States v. Posnanski, 217 F.3d 842 (4th Cir. 2000) (per curiam) (unpublished disposition) (“So 
long as the basis for reasonable approximation is at hand, difficulties in achieving exact measurements will not 
preclude a trial court from ordering restitution. The district judge enjoys discretion as to the restitutionary amount, 
with the stipulation that the defendant pay restitution only for losses traceable to the illegal activity. A restitution 
order may be relatively broad as long as the harm is either a direct result of, or closely related to, the defendant’s 
scheme. In general, restitution orders should be affirmed in the absence of an abuse of discretion. However, the 
calculation of loss is a question of fact and is reviewed only for clear error.” (citations omitted) (internal quotation 
marks omitted)). 
 138. FED. R. EVID. 1101(d)(3) (stating that the Federal Rules of Evidence do not apply in sentencing 
proceedings). 
 139. United States v. Agyemang, 876 F.2d 1264, 1271–72 (7th Cir. 1989) (“But by insisting that a defendant 
have a ‘reasonable opportunity to rebut’ contested hearsay, we do not mean that a judge must hold an elaborate 
trial-type proceeding before considering hearsay in sentencing; instead, the judge must simply give the defendant 
an opportunity to show why the hearsay information is wrong and to present his side of the story. And by insisting 
that the contested hearsay be reliable, we do not mean that the hearsay must fit into some recognized hearsay 
exception or that the government prove the hearsay is true beyond a reasonable doubt; rather, the sentencing judge 
must be satisfied, in light of all the circumstances, that the hearsay is worthy of credence.” (citation omitted)); see 
also United States v. Clark, 437 F. App’x 780, 781 (11th Cir. 2011) (unpublished disposition); United States v. 
Wallace, 451 F. App’x 523, 528 (6th Cir. 2011) (unpublished disposition); Posnanski, 217 F.3d at 842.  
 140. See, e.g., Bourne, 130 F.3d at 1447–48 (“The special agent based his testimony on his recollection of 
the bank auditor’s report prepared on the day of the robbery. It is the type of evidence routinely relied upon by the 
FBI in determining amounts stolen from banks. However, since this matter is to be remanded for sentencing [for 
different reasons], we suggest that the district court revisit the amount of restitution. It should be a simple matter 
for the special agent to obtain the auditor’s report or for the bank auditor to testify.”); United States v. Hairston, 
888 F.2d 1349, 1353 (11th Cir. 1989) (finding that a letter written by an attorney for the Bank, which sets out the 
amount of actual loss suffered by the Bank, and explains how the Bank’s loss resulted from the defendant’s 
fraudulent actions, was sufficiently reliable for the district court to consider it in forming the restitution order, that 
the defendant had ample opportunity at his sentencing hearing to refute the information contained in the letter, and 
that the amount of loss was sufficiently proved by the government). 
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Florida—without losing sight of fairness to the defendant and the integrity of the 
judicial system—it should seriously consider adopting a similar approach.  
CONCLUSION 
Due to the unjust results that can occur when the court has limited discretion 
and when the State must meet onerous requirements to prove the amount of loss 
sustained by the victim of a crime, the Florida Legislature should revise section 
775.089 to better conform to the purposes of restitution proceedings, which are 
both compensatory and punitive. Recognizing that many victims cannot testify to 
the fair market value of their property, the Fourth DCA recommended providing 
the trial court with broader discretion to further the purposes of restitution. In 
addition, the Fourth DCA’s proposal does not require the court to use fair market 
value in determining the amount of the victim’s loss and expressly permits the 
admission of hearsay evidence in restitution proceedings. As such, the Fourth 
DCA’s proposal offers a great starting point in revising section 775.089 because it 
relaxes both the measurement of value and the method of proof in restitution 
proceedings. However, the Fourth DCA’s proposal does not explicitly address 
important concerns, such as the appropriate measure of value, the lack of reliability 
of hearsay evidence, and the defendant’s right to due process. Thus, in light of the 
concerns mentioned above, the Florida Legislature should adopt the Fourth DCA’s 
proposal, but with the following three caveats that incorporate aspects of the 
federal standard.141 
First, because the Fourth DCA’s proposal does not provide an alternative 
measure to fair market value, the statute should explain that the court may use “fair 
amount” value to determine the amount of the victim’s loss in all circumstances.142 
Second, although some Florida courts already provide that hearsay must contain 
“some minimal indicia of reliability” to be admissible in a restitution hearing, it 
would be wise to include this language explicitly in the statute as well.143 Third, 
because the Confrontation Clause does not apply at sentencing, the Legislature 
should consider providing the defendant with an opportunity to rebut or refute any 
hearsay evidence that is offered by the State, as is already done in Florida capital 
sentencing proceedings.144 
 ________________________  
 141. As with any change in statutory law, there may be unanticipated problems that arise in the future. 
However, because the recommendation mirrors the federal standard, there is an entire body of federal case law that 
will aid in addressing these problems.  
 142. For purposes of this Article, “fair amount” value and a “reasonable approximation” of value are treated 
as the same, at least in terms of monetary value measurements. See supra note 137. 
 143. This does not mean that the hearsay evidence must meet an established exception. See supra note 139. 
“To show that the evidence lacks ‘minimal indicia of reliability’ a defendant must establish ‘(1) that the challenged 
evidence is materially false, and (2) that it actually served as a basis for the [restitution order].’” Bourne, 130 F.3d 
at 1447 (quoting Hairston, 888 F.2d at 1353). “Whether hearsay evidence is reliable, and thus admissible, is a 
determination left to the discretion of the sentencing judge.” United States v. Gerstein, 104 F.3d 973, 978 (7th Cir. 
1997). 
 144. See supra notes 57, 104, 130, 139 and accompanying text. 
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In accordance with the Fourth DCA’s recommendation, and the caveats 
mentioned above, section 775.089(7) should ultimately read as follows, with the 
suggested changes in italics: 
Any dispute as to the proper amount or type of restitution shall be 
resolved by the court by the preponderance of the evidence. In 
determining restitution amounts, the court may exercise discretion 
as required to further the purposes of restitution. The court may 
consider any appropriate factor in awarding a fair amount that 
adequately compensates the victim. The burden of demonstrating 
the amount of the loss sustained by a victim as a result of the 
offense is on the state attorney. The burden of demonstrating the 
present financial resources and the absence of potential future 
financial resources of the defendant and the financial needs of the 
defendant and his or her dependents is on the defendant. The 
burden of demonstrating such other matters as the court deems 
appropriate is upon the party designated by the court as justice 
requires. Hearsay evidence is admissible in restitution proceedings 
if the hearsay evidence is found by the court to have a minimal 
indicia of reliability. The defendant may refute hearsay evidence 
offered by the state attorney. 
In addition, because the above proposal permits the court to use discretion “to 
further the purposes of restitution,” but the purposes of restitution do not appear 
anywhere in section 775.089, the Florida Legislature should explicitly include the 
purposes of restitution at the forefront of the statute. With the implementation of 
these suggested changes, the purposes of section 775.089 are more likely to be 
accomplished, which means that defendants who cause loss to innocent victims are 
less likely to receive a windfall for their criminal actions and that victims of crime 
are more likely to be compensated for their losses.  
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